Chapter 23
Ford Consolidates
2THE SCIENTIFIC EMERGENCE
3 The ‘‘ DIRECT’’ effect of the use of alloys scarcely needs further detailed mention; it was, simply stated, a progression of inevitable research efficiency. There was, however, a far-reaching ‘‘indirect’’ effect of its use which can best be demonstrated by a further discussion of Ford as the most prominent servant of that indirect result, evolution.
4 ‘‘In the first place,’’ we may imagine Ford conjecturing, ‘‘if I am going to alloy my steels in a multitude of ways, I certainly do not intend to buy already manufactured-into-use-form units of sheets, tubes, H-sections, et cetera, and then have to resmelt and reprocess those steels in order to introduce the alloys. That would mean paying additionally to my own work for the original processing, transporting and warehousing, plus a probable inordinate profit to the steel monopoly manufacturer. So I will make my own steels. Moreover, since I already know of a multitude of metals that may be used with specific advantage, I can conceive of a sudden shift to the employment of metals outside the iron-steel group, where the weight-strengtheconomic factor shows a specific advantage; for instance, the aluminum alloying group. I am not inclined to tie up my capital in any one mine or source because, in my case, capital is freedom of ability which obviously involves dependence on no one mine or source.’’
5 Ford’s principle being CONTINUITY, he inferred (by intuitively understanding the truth of the flexible adjustment of the tension line and its superiority) the necessity of recognizing that his capital was primarily ‘‘intellect,’’ compounded with a credit of his intellect and capability by vast numbers of workers and consumers.
6 ‘‘As there are many as yet undeveloped sources of the materials I currently need,’’ he probably continued, ‘‘I will have to be the temporary operator of such sources. However, I shall be only too glad, when I have these under control, to sell these sources to competitive material monopolists who unquestionably will run after me in the hope of procuring the monopoly of such sources.
7 ‘‘Let them hold the bag; I wish to be free with all my capital to pick and choose continuously. Logically, if I do not subscribe to the ownership of sources, I cannot tie my capital up in advance anticipatory inventories in warehouses. Warehouses are in effect transplanted highly concentrate mines. Before I may have exhausted my warehoused supply I may find cause to redesign; by having to eliminate the material so stored I should lose that much capital, which I have no right to do.
8 ‘‘In view of these rationalizations, there is only one course to pursue, i.e., develop a TIMING system, a time-coordinated planning. Through such a time control plan I can so organize my efforts (energy) that I shall be able to take from sources daily only such materials as I need to maintain the daily flow. Having made an original postulation of what my first day’s run should be, I must order forward that run on pure assumption just as I reasonably assumed and proved my first mass market without waiting for orders, as did the others.
9 ‘‘In this manner, my whole inventory will be in motion, with the exception of a small fraction in the form of finished parts visible in stacks adjacent the final assembly line.’’
10 In an amazingly short time, after the War, Ford had ships loading and daily sailing out of Iquique, and other ports of all the countries of the world, as well as caravans, trains and trucks in every land, to the tune of some $70,000,000 worth of materials always in motion, with the exception of final visibly comprehensive accumulations at the assembly line.
11 All who have dealt with Ford in the supply of materials will attest the fact that, when buying, for instance, a carload of ground limestone at Joliet, Illinois, etc., etc., etc., he insists upon—and this is well understood by the supplier—the rolling of the car of lime TODAY. (Incidentally he pays for it today.) Once the shipment starts on its way, Fords checkers, who constitute part of the extraordinary mechanism of his shipment-motion-time plan, not only keep constant check on the position progression of every item, but also, see to it that it loses no time en route.
12 Ford, carrying out his idea of efficient continuity-service (SERVICE because it WORKS) in all likelihood continued reasoning as follows:
13 ‘‘In connection with my design of a world-encompassing, continuous 24-hours-a-day ‘moving picture’ operation, I had better study my world map with great care and see how I may route shipments to avoid penetration through costly centers. (Freight differentials are so inequitous that it costs me as much to move a freight car across New York City as it does to move it 800 miles across open country.) Moreover, since I originally wrote OFF the books all cost of plant and structure, not carrying this for bonding purposes as does Fincap in a debit or debt column—I am perfectly free to deploy my materials and fabricating operations (whether for the fabricating of parts for ultimate product, or of tools to make tools) to logical locations, world wide in scope of placement (indifferent to sovereign boundaries), i.e., to mean centers between the source of material, available power and shipping facilities, and shifting consumer geography.
14 ‘‘I shall, also, not overlook the favorable fact that, since I have popular man (the worker) driving an automobile, the politicians by pointing an accusing finger at motoring Murphy and calling him a ‘plutocrat’ are extracting exquisite road taxes from his pocket. However, to justify this hi-jacking, the politician is having to furnish the worker with roads on which to ride. This cycle of events makes it possible for me to establish my assembly plants at theoretical locations of greatest efficiency, without regard to the fact that they may be highly decentralized from railroads, with the certainty that the workers and goods can reach the plant by truck and car.’’
15 The result of Ford’s rationalization—granted that it may have been highly subconscious and intuitive although inevitable to his postulation of the principle of continuous movement along the production line—was so highly efficient that it forced the entire industrial world to follow suit. Until that time the industrial world (90% of which, exclusive of Ford, was controlled by Fincap) represented the pole opposed to continuity, that is, the warehouse era promotional scheme of inefficiency and discard. Break down the other fellow. A broken down fellow is exploitable. In pursuing competitively the old principle of survival of the fittest, Fincap had tried, of course, not to eliminate himself, a possibility he always fearfully suppressed by ‘‘morale.’’ COMPETITION is a FEAR-MOTIVATED word. Ford, on the other hand, was motivated simply by LONGING for GREATER-EVER-GREATER EFFICIENCY OF SERVICE and longing to realize his early dream of an integrated industrial and agrarian society.
16 Ford has often been accused of ruthlessness in his evolutionary tactics, but the accusation stems primarily from the progaganda of the finance capital world. It would be inaccurate to say that it emanates from his competitors, for Ford quite sublimely acknowledges no ‘‘competitors.’’
17 The propaganda inferring Ford’s ‘‘ruthlessness’’ was primarily evoked in the following manner. When Ford decided to evolve his time-plan of operation to replace static capital investment in sources and inventories, he not only had to posit an assumption of daily need, but to underwrite one complete cycle of operations from the furthest reaches of his original shipment through to assembly, delivery and repayment by the automobile wholesaler, thus replenishing his ‘‘ability’’ or credit.
18 Inasmuch as this assumption involved a mobile inventory of some $70,000,000, augmented by a tremendous outlay for decentralized manufactories and assembly plants at central points of consumption instead of in one plant (Detroit), Ford went to Fincap in New York and asked to borrow $70,000,000.
19 Was Fincap glad to lend it to him?
20 ‘‘INDEED …INDEED, Mr. Ford!’’
21 Not only was there unfettered collateral in his unmortgaged plant, but should he fail to repay the loan Fincap would be enabled to conquer this disturbing random element which continuously defeated his own so-called principle of ‘‘conservation.’’ In such an eventuality, the staticism principle would, in effect, continue to yield high revenue without attention to service for the populace, and without altering Fincap’s retardation of progress.
22 Now, Ford, in establishing his principle of continuity production for popular consumption, developed so profitable a business for local wholesalers and retailers (the commercial ‘‘small fry’’ or would-be little Fincaps of the warehouse era) that they considered a contract with Ford worth great effort to obtain and almost any temporary inconvenience or hardship to retain.
23 Ford, having abandoned many attempts at reform because he found them futile, including his famous ‘‘peace ship,’’ also gave up the idea of preaching idealistically against ‘‘competitive profit’’ even to the small fry capitalists. He retained the notion, however, that ultimate efficiency would eliminate the unwholesome factors of an unearned profit economy. This efficiency made him ‘‘hard boiled’’ with his wholesale-retail outlets, but he did not become at any time underhanded or unscrupulous.
24 Knowing the degree to which a distributor valued a Ford car distribution contract, Ford foresightedly and forthrightly included in his agency contract a clause that was quite thoroughly understood by each and every distributor at the time of signing the contract. This clause was to the effect that Ford was empowered to demand the licensee’s acceptance, at any time within the year, of the full quota of cars stipulated by the licensee annually in advance, and in relation to which his earnings were proportional. Furthermore, Ford, when agreeing to license the distributor, received the written promise of the licensee to pay cash upon demand for any or all cars delivered to him as part of his (the licensees) annual quota.
25 This agreement was in effect between Ford and his licensees for years before Ford had recourse to the employment of this clause. The fact that he had not enforced this stipulation (fairly arrived at because the licensee sought the license from Ford and the license paid the licensee well) established by habit in the brains of many licensees the notion-precedent that Ford did not expect ever to put the precautionary provision into operation. It was just ‘‘one of those things.’’
26 Then, quite suddenly, Ford found himself unable to make his turnover realize a return sufficiently rapidly to meet the date line of his $70,000,000 debt to the finance capital world. This was because the time control plan and its gargantuan expansion had involved a multitude of theoretical postulates of performance.
27 The payment date drew near. Only one week to go! Fincap’s mouth began to water. The biggest breakdown of progress in the whole course of history, by means of debt, was within his foreclosing grasp.
28 To meet the issue, Ford set in operation his emergency licensee clause. He shipped rapidly to his distributors every car that could be processed out of his mobile inventory and demanded cash in payment therefor. Of course, an animal howl went up, but alignment with Ford and his principle of continuity service for popular patronage was so truly profitable for the widespread army of small fry capitalists and distributors, that the vast majority of those whose credit with local banks was sum-totally adequate to produce the necessary $70,000,000 borrowed the required amount from their local banking institutions. Thus, Ford was enabled to pay off his debt to Fincap. The little capitalists—themselves indirect debt merchants—passed on the debt to the little local banks, which, in turn, due to the necessity of integration and integrity within the capitalistic system itself, could and did borrow from the big banks. So the debt was returned to its starting point, the central capitalist finance world.
29 Ford had established in reality for all people, for all time, the principle of industrial sychronization with ‘‘TIME. ’’
30 The production of people’s goods became synchronized with what mathematics had long before pointed out to be the true scientific state of affairs: a TIME-RATE world, a calculus world. Until the Ford incident, industry had been managed and accounted solely by static arithmetic, despite its existence in an eternally factual time-rate energy radiant world. Einstein’s ‘‘relativity’’ reached the Murphys through Ford.
31 Ford’s ‘‘ruthlessness’’ was no greater than the ‘‘ruthlessness’’ of Leonardo da Vinci when he insisted upon actually measuring in truly scientific manner (that is, in degrees, minutes, seconds and thirds of a circle) every art object, every living entity coming within his sphere of contact. Leonardo’s efficiency of observation evolved a mathematical ‘‘perspective frame’’ and brought about the disillusionment of every pagan romance, of every Christian bigotry credo, and of every academic scholar’s pretentiousness. Conversely, it enabled him to design great networks of irrigation canals and to invent the wheelbarrow and countless other commonplace instruments and processes then currently in high use-state, despite the complete lack of inanimate power means (other than diminutive water wheels). In consequence, Leonardo’s contemporaries called him not only ‘‘ruthless’’ but ‘‘heretic,’’ which had a real and awful meaning in those days of horrific religious inquisition. Pretentious scholars hurled ‘‘ignoramus’’ at him, and the people knew him as a ‘‘sorcerer.’’ But most wounding of all to the immortal painter of The Last Supper and Mona Lisa was the epithet ‘‘feelingless prosaic trickster’’ so unjustly applied by the esthetic coterie of stingingly eloquent, chi-chi ‘‘artistic’’ earthians of his day.
32 Until Ford’s irrevocable victory over staticism and debt, he had been primarily concerned with the process of production, and only secondarily with the improvement of its end-object, the automobile. Although he had had a considerable hand in the inventions comprising the total-invention ‘‘automobile,’’ he had not been its sole inventor, and, in common with many other inventors, he was momentarily satisfied so far as the end-product was concerned with having attained an invention that ‘‘worked’’ and was popularly acquirable and useful.
33 When the ‘‘forces’’ of debt-and-exploitation realized that Ford had emerged signally victorious from the ‘‘corner’’ in which they thought they had him, they had further recourse to a deceptive form of attempted competition. The car of the non-competing Ford which, in its mechanical parts, had been the beneficiary of the alloying science and was, therefore, a highly reliable and popular instrument, was, also, a relatively uncomfortable and ‘‘grotesque’’ contraption in the popular, functionally-unseeing eye. This had not been remedied by changes in outward appearance, general structure of dimensional design for the reason that its superficial general changelessness allowed of its being manufactured at progressively lower and lower cost, with a concomitant depletion of profit to imitating competitors. The populace, with the infiltration of Old World commerce and esthetics, had long since lost its pristine simplicity of perceptionof-essentials which was so characteristic of it in the first days of communal settlement in the new continent. Therefore, the people were readily responsive to Fincaps next deception.
34 The exploiting-competitors, through the media of advertising and the formation of opinion through the Fincap-allied press (Ford did not advertise at that time), set about fostering a public sense of dissatisfaction in the comfort, luxury and pride-of-ownership aspects of the Ford product. They called attention to the fact that they themselves were furnishing seemingly far more luxurious, bigger and ‘‘classier’’ designs than any exhibited by Ford. They appealed with unerring thrusts to the vanity of the consistent suckers of such propaganda as the ‘‘own your own home and become one of us propertystable citizens.’’ The nation-wide competition in miniature coach making by boys, sponsored and conducted by Fincap’s Fisher Body Company, was typical of the retrogressive propaganda. They did not mention that their diversions to surface attraction had to be paid for, and that the ‘‘cost’’ was being taken out of the mechanical efficiency and longevity of service of their product, which could ill afford such depletion, having already been functionally outclassed by Ford’s scientific alloying processes and his ‘‘service’’ principle. Paradoxically $25,000 Rolls Royces of that period developed their
35 svelte beauty through functional revelation in design, whereas the cheap, popular cars were ‘‘tricked’’ up to hide function.
36 The propaganda succeeded—at least for the moment. Ford’s patronage by the populace fell off markedly and Ford became the victim of utter unappreciation on the part of his beneficiaries. He was torn between the temptation to close-up shop forever and his life-long-dominant longing-necessity to pioneer once more. Being an artist (an intuitive dynamic senser) and remembering his years of fight to establish the vast principle of scientific service-by-the-peopleto-the-people, he inevitably chose to pioneer again. He designed an improved car that would be not only more efficient mechanically than any other theretofore available at any cost, but one that would conform to the popular ‘‘notion’’—standards of ‘‘agreeable’’ and ‘‘happy’’ use.
37 While evolving and thoroughly testing his new car he shut down his world-wide plant. Every step of the process was carried out under his own DIRECT supervision. When he was personally assured of success in design and operation, he ordered his time-planning department, his production machinery designers, and his designers of tools-to-make-tools, to return to work. He invested a fresh $52,000,000 in the new unit. This was, however, exclusively an outlay for process machinery and is not be be confused with his mobile inventory investment. The expenditure for machinery, he wrote down as usual—to zero.
38 The new car was a success—faster and, of scientific necessity, safer, than any other on the road except an inconsequential .1% of special custom machines. It was the first popular car to go a milea-minute. When these initial Model A’s came out, an amusing anecdote described how the driver of an expensive, imported Mercedes observed that he was being overtaken by one of the new Fords. He stepped on the gas and went faster and faster until finally he attained his top speed of 70. The Ford drew alongside and its proletarian driver earnestly shouted, ‘‘Hey, can you tell me how to shift into high? I just bought it!’’
39 Popular patronage reconverged on Ford. But he did not halt, as Fincap would have done, to reap the maximum profit return from the new product. Ford is quite willing to make the worst of blunders once because he is a true trial-and-error artist and scientist. Despite public approval, no sooner was the new car in full production before he evolved an even better car—one that was more able and more efficient than any transportation vehicle ever produced in the world, the ‘‘V8.’’ This new progression of product evolution was consistent with Ford’s own behind-the-scenes evolution and testifies to his maturing. Ford’s attention had become focused upon end-product and he observed with delight the popular repercussions to the new model which indicated public appreciation of his having paid attention to the people’s utilitarian requirements and their advancing harmonic evaluation. Human dignity was involved.
40 When Ford had completed his 10,000,000th car (he has nowproduced over 27,000,000) he observed that inasmuch as a car has an average longevity of five years (now approaching seven due to the inception of additional scientific alloying possibilities) and that inasmuch as 2,000,000 Fords a year constituted the largest production he could envisage attaining, relative to known factors, he realized that his maximum production would probably be but 10,000,000 cars in every five years, only sufficient to replace those already rolling. He realized that the majority of his customers were coincidentally his own workers, direct and indirect. Actually there obtained then a cycle of people producing their own transport media through industrial coordination and simultaneously the means of acquistion not only of the transport media, but also of all other essentials.
41 There has been a vast amount of propaganda by the Communist Party against Ford. Through ignorance of science and industry they improperly identify Ford’s motivation and activity with Big Business. For long the American Communists have also improperly identified Big Business and Industry, erroneously assuming the unearned increment corollary of the former to be generic to the latter. Two factors ‘‘seemingly’’ substantiate their criticism of Ford: his lowering of wages in the early ‘30s and ‘‘regimentation’’ of the workers in Ford factories.
42 The lowering of the wage scale of the Ford Company workers, they maintain, was a flagrant retraction from Ford’s earlier program of then-unheard-of wages for the lowliest worker in the Ford plant. Many will remember his establishment of a minimum $5 a day for even a ‘‘sweeper’’ at a time when the theme of a song ‘‘A dollar a day is very good pay when you work on the boulevard’’ was still popularly true. Ford progressively amplified minimum wages from this $5 level for a number of years. Despite the seemingly lower wages established by Ford in the instance particularly referred to by the Communists, Ford has not actually ever lowered his workers’ income.
43 Thinking in terms of production by workers and of the workers’ ability to acquire the product of their cooperative effort, Ford realized that the dollar-buying power of the worker’s dollar had increased enormously in proportion to the specific satisfaction attainable in product to be purchased. Therefore, he understood that lowering the number of dollars does not of necessity mean a lowering of the worker’s wage-ability to acquire goods and services.
44 As an example of his reasoning, one may cite vegetable produce in the improvement of which—both in standard and availability--Ford’s tractors (as cultivators) and trucks (as a transportation medium of universal distribution) and passenger automobiles (as transport of worker-purchaser) played a major role. One cannot regard the present vegetable product as being the same as that which the worker could obtain with his ‘‘dollar’’ prior to or early in the establishment of the automobile as a popular instrument. The stringless fresh green beans available the year around today when compared with the stringy, halfwilted product infrequently obtainable in fresh form during a short season prior to the advent of the automobile is unquestionably worth, in specific energy to the consumer (by actual calories and harmonious nutriment) many times its predecessor.
45 Ford had consistently reinvested capital gain into improved process and ability, safety, comfort and service of end-product, the automobile, with the result that the latter continually lowered in cost and price. This happened throughout the years he continued Model ‘‘T.’’ Wherefore, a given wage dollar bought increasing trackless individual transportation facility. On this basis alone, considering his workers as his primary customers, Ford would have been justified in lowering wages progressively, after announcing his $5 a day minimum, were his aim the maintainance of a level rate of compensation. Ford did not lower wages at that time, however, but continued to improve his automobile. The current Ford car, retailing for approximately $700, could not have been duplicated 15 years ago for $700,000. Twenty years ago, when Ford first announced his $5 a day scale, neither Mr. Rockefeller nor Mr. Morgan could have acquired, at any price, a vehicle comparable to the present Ford car.
46 Soon after Franklin Roosevelt became President all gold was withdrawn from circulation, and the largest quantity of bullion in all history was impounded. The dollar was actually almost halved in specie value, but actually it brought a greater number of shirts because shirts had already dropped from $3 to $1. Being on a worldwide operation basis, Ford was compelled of necessity to maintain a wage rate that took into consideration the international devaluation of the dollar.
47 In reality Ford did not reduce the proportion of wage ability when he reduced its dollars and cents figure; on the contrary, he allowed wage ability to increase enormously, for in so doing he developed a continuity of employment that supplanted his earlier intermittent employment with a resultant higher annual wage. Furthermore, it is probable that the proportion of dollars paid out in wages to dollars invested in materials and power (none goes into rent for, be it remembered, Ford writes off plant immediately upon its establishment) has increased consistently.
48 The reason the Communist confuses the motives of Ford with that of Big Business is that Big Business’s scientific behind-thescenes researches constantly ape, or, through the fraternity of the engineers, participate in the technical data for which Ford sets the pace. The General Motors plants seem visually to be on a surface par with the Ford plant. This visible similarity of these two mammoth automobile producing industries causes the Communist to say that they are identical activities. The ‘‘Big Business’’ automobile manufacturer is, however, still exploitation and profit-minded and extracts profit for dividend-distribution-purposes which does not go back into the business to create greater service of wages, whereas Ford is specifically motivated by the service principle, turning all profit back into the establishment of an increasing mechanical serviceability, ever amplifying his principle of better product and more work.
49 Inasmuch as the primarily-for-profit world is still so factually existent, it continues to be impossible for the Ford principle to be isolated and popularly demonstrated all the way through to the consumer. When it comes to the distribution of product, Ford must contend with multitudinous factors of the old exploitation world; for instance, with the distribution station’s ‘‘real’’ estate impositions and the distributors political and financial relationships in local marts. So unreasonable, intrinsic and intricate are the ramifications of the latter that Ford considers it inefficient in most instances to vie directly for local popular patronage. This intrigue which he avoids was demonstrated in the ability of ex-Mayor Walker politically to prevent the introduction of Ford taxis in New York, under Ford Company operation, at one-half the then-current taxi tariff. Although a service of evident benefit to people in efficiency, cost, size and safety would have resulted, Walker vetoed it because the taxi privilege racket was a major revenue producer for his sponsoring political machine.
50 It is because of the existence of this local racket condition that Ford cars costing the Ford Motor Company 100 per lb. completely assembled at Edgewater, N. J., the assembly plant for New York City, and including a reserve for evolutionary scientific change in plant and product, retail in New York City, just across the river, at 22/40 per lb.—a 120% gross overtake by the entrepreneur profit world. Of course the net overtake is much smaller. Possibly 50% must be deducted from the 120% for service station maintenance, et cetera.
51 Ford became intent some years ago on reducing to some extent the superusurious finance charges attendant upon ‘‘time purchase,’’ the popular mode of acquiring an automobile which, incidentally, makes it a fact that the majority of people ‘‘rent’’ transportation rather than ‘‘buy’’ their automobiles. To bust this multiple fee finance racket, he created a finance company of his own known as the Universal Credit Corporation.
52 This venture into the field of banking mechanisms proved a second inadvertent life-saver for Ford and his popular service principle when the banking crash of ‘32 occurred, which latter may be traced throughout this discourse and later chapters to the direct influence of the Ford time-control principle and, therefore, indirectly to the World War and the experience gained therefrom by Ford. When the ‘32 bank moratorium was imposed by the Administration, shutting off from Ford vast sums of credit on deposit in banks—jeopardizing his continuity of operation—the Universal Credit Corporation proved itself the means of continuing. So tremendous and potentially profitable to bankers was the Universal Credit Corporation (it was considered to be the major competitor of their amalgamated legally sustainable but nonetheless highly usurious time-payment organizations) that, overnight, Ford was able to sell Universal Credit Corporation for $50,000,000 cash. This sale to Fincap spanned the time-lag until his credit could be released from the closed banks.
53 The specific rationalization that we wish to bring into relief at this juncture is that Ford’s unending process of doing more with less had the effect, relative to any given product standard, of deflating the cost of acquisition of that specific standard, which is another way of saying increased wage ‘‘dollarability.’’
54 The Ford decentralization and mobilization and service process so rapidly reduced the prices of fixed standard, and even deteriorated standard, real estate relative-purchase or rental ‘‘values’’ as well as prices, for instance, of #1 Prime Western hogs, that just before the bank moratorium, 10 meals were actually being sold in New York City, which, albeit poor in quality, were sustaining thousands of people. The progression of prices was so precipitously downward and man work was being so rapidly supplanted by the scientific industrial progression that work was scarce for all but a few. There were, consequently, fewer wage earners to spend. Those who had dollars, however, could buy a given standard for an acceleratingly lower portion of their dollar.
55 This is to say that if the true standard of the dollar is what the worker may exchange it for, i.e., the cost of a meal or the price of shelter, then a meal which cost 250 in 1920 was selling in 1930 for 10. A man still receiving a dollar-an-hour from the industrial world had, in fact, increased his rate in 1930 to $25 an hour in 1920 dollarability. This being so, even though the number of workers was reduced, the number of dollars still being distributed by the industry of Ford’s leadership increased 25-fold in the post-War decade which was a far greater increase than the amount of worker reduction. Therefore, more dollars of food-buying ability were available for circulation than before, and the depression was in reality a lack of ability to account a high relative devaluation of the intrinsic cost of the land which was the debt base of Fincap.
56 Another trouble was that there was no way to make the one man who was getting a proportional $25 an hour increase, distribute or circulate his earnings to those who had been replaced by the machine. The only way to do this would be by the system outlined in the chapter, Dollarability, wherein work would be distributed on a minimum stint basis so that all people might have a chance to work and be self-supporting.
57 Ford was quite aware that dollars accruing to the static standard world from rents and other non-productive sources were diminishing so rapidly in relative volume to that of industrial production as to threaten with bankruptcy those whose income was mainly an unearned increment from intrinsic properties.
58 Since, however, the entrepreneur and profit world still controlled politics to a marked degree, it was possible for the politics-controlled government temporarily to halt the ‘29--‘32 reckoning. It did this through government by increasing the so-called popular ‘‘debt’’ to absorb the property bankruptcy while arbitrarily pegging its further ravages. It is not yet evident to the layman that this complete bankruptcy of Fincap did occur in 1932, wherefore the Communist is ‘‘railing’’ against an in-fact ‘‘dead’’ system. Thinking the system still alive (as do, indeed, many of Fincap’s progeny) and not being able to sense by personal contact the Ford industrial service principle because Ford has not been able to articulate completely through to the customer, due to the entrepreneuring contamination, and unaware that Fincap is being maintained in dead dummy form by politics and government for the sale of a framework of popularly understood means of transaction, the Communist continues to confuse Ford with the beheaded chicken’s run-around of the axed entrepreneuring profit system.
59 It is paradoxical that the spokesmen for Communism in America should have so bitterly attacked Ford while the mother country, Russia, developed a worshipful religion of Ford, whose industrial mechanisms the Communists in Russia perceived, through distance perspective, to be essential to their success in the attempt permanently to establish socialism—a political theory which necessitates an abundance of primary essentials in a country of scarcity of essentials. Russia, through isolation by statecraft from the sovereign nations of Fincap, at first had non-available the abundances which might otherwise have provided earlier success in her realization of socialism.
60 No one man, organization or principle has been so utilized by the in-Russia-Communists as Henry Ford. There is nothing in any way incompatible between the industrial service principle of Ford and Russian Communism. The fabricated-by-illusion differentiation is ‘‘optical’’ only as viewed through the arbitrarily imposed and soon quite-evidently-to-be-removed rusting screen door of Fincap’s legal debt contrivance.
61 With regard to the second criticism leveled at Ford, namely, regimentation of the workers in Ford establishments, it is to be noted that the specific focus of the criticism is actually a single personality, namely, Ford’s production manager.
62 Probably no one factor has beclouded the Ford ‘‘ideal’’ more than has the hard fisted management of this production man. The production routine of the world-encompassing Ford establishment is so utterly vast that its Captain, Mr. Ford, has of necessity to attend to the progressive aspects of his service in the further extension of his principle. Irrevocable establishment of progressive principles is of far greater importance to him than is any remedial attention to personality idiosyncrasies of his workers. These are personal limitations, and personalities die. So Ford has wisely continued to rely on the proven production-routine ability of this man, which is great. There are multitudes of stupidity factors contemporaneously to be contended with which no amount of namby-pamby philosophizing can deal with successfully.
63 Ford himself is so heavily engaged in the scientific improvement of process and product that the personalities participating in the running of the by-Ford-created-machine to reproduce the by-Fordcreated-product seem of no more importance to him than whether a gentle tongued lady or an oathsome truck driver purchases and drives one of his Ford cars. Ford has given up ‘‘reform.’’ He earnestly tried plenty of it and found it did not work. He is now consecrated completely to new form production.
64 If Ford’s production mechanisms or end-products can be run by bullies, they certainly can be more ably run—and will eventually be so run—by more tolerant and intelligent characters evolutionary to the intelligent popular scientific inter-service. Needless to say, the bullying of the production manager is effective only in the Detroit headquarters. There is little evidence of it elsewhere in the vastly decentralized Ford operation. Its existence even in Detroit, however, is no justification for a mis-appraisal of the service principle which Ford pioneers for man.
65 Before leaving this discussion, it is important for our continuity of thought to remark that Ford’s first important breakaway from Fincap’s control occurred many years ago, soon after his successful establishment of his principle of a ‘‘moving line’’ of production for popular consumption. This principle, it will be recalled, involved the assumption that if enough cars were produced to justify a production line, they could be produced at so low a price that popular man as well as Fincap could purchase them. This being an unproved principle, it took a large pioneering credit to underwrite it. After several bitterly discouraging failures, involving complete bankruptcy, Ford finally was successful—with the financial aid of friendly Detroit capitalists—in raising enough money successfully to complete the postulated cycle. Although the principle demonstrated itself healthily, it soon became evident to Ford that the shareholders in his undertaking, thinking that they had hit upon an eternal gold mine, wished to EXTRACT profit in inordinate proportion to their original investment rather than subscribing to reapplication of the returns to an expansion of service.
66 Sitting alone and thoughtfully on his back fence—where it is said he still considers all important matters—Ford concluded that the rapid credit amplification of his activity was born of popular spontaneous subscription to his principle. So he determined that all credit amplifications should be continually set to work again in the improvement of production and service until extended to all the people of the earth.
67 To effect this determination—and to avoid forever interference in his singleness of purpose through legally-established minority stockholders’ rights (a capital finance contrivance designed to make possible a minority’s guidance of vast earning activities), Ford was forced to buy-in all outstanding shares. He paid what was then a fabulous sum for them. Had he procrastinated in this determination, it might have been many more years before our industrial emancipation from feudal chiseling would have occurred.
68 Many people laugh at Henry Ford and his hobbies—his Americana and his folk dancing and his fiddling. We might laugh similarly at the paradox of Leonardo’s designs for whorehouses and mausoleums. It is highly credible that Ford is so non-egotistical as to think himself artistic only in the matter of collecting antiquities or in ‘‘twinkle’’ dancing. Little does he perceive himself to be the greatest artist of our day.
69 Nevertheless he is, for, single-handedly, he has conceived and painted the greatest picture that has ever been painted for mankind, a continuous animated motion picture that encircles the whole world. When there is time perspective on Ford equivalent to the 400 year interval between ourselves and Leonardo da Vinci, which enables us to appraise da Vinci as the greatest artist of the Middle Ages, Ford will undoubtedly be acclaimed by the people of that later day as certainly the greatest artist of the 20th century.